Neal v. State by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection
12-13-1960
Neal v. State
Roger J. Traynor
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Neal v. State 55 Cal.2d 11 (1960).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/599
) 
[Sac; No. 7000. In Bank. Dee. 13,1960.] 
HOMER NEAIJ, Petitioller, v. THE STATE OF CALI-
FOHNIAet al., He:;poudents. 
[1] Mandamus - Other Remedy - Appeal. - )Inndamus will not 
ordinarily lie to COl'reet nil error in a finnl and appealable 
judgllwnt. 
[2] Id.-Demand and Refusal.-Although a writ of mandamus may 
issue to vaeate a judgment entered by a court that lacked juris-
diction, n motion to vacate stich judgmcnt mu!.'t first be madt' 
in the comt that entcred the judgmcnt, and a denial of such 
motion must be appealed in the regular manner. 
[3] Habeas Corpus-Propriety of Remedy: Petition.-If the facts 
justify the remedy of habeas corpus, it is immaterial that peti-
tioner prayed for an inappropriate remedy, sueh liS mandamus; 
[lJ See Cal.Jur.2d, Manflamus, § 19; Am.Jur., MandullIufol,!i flO. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] lIandamuii, § 15(4)"; [2] l\fnnlilllllus. 
§ 14; [3] Habeas Corpus, §§ 1, 51; [4] Habeas Corpus, § 3; [,i, 6] 
Courts, § 9; [7, 10] Habeas Corpus, ~ 3-t(1); [8J Habeas COl'pu~. 
§ 12; [9] Hahc:u! Corpus, § 8; [11] Stntute~, § 111; [12] flal)(,l1~ 
Corpu!', § 33: [13, H] Hahpu~ ~lIrpu", ~ 3·lI;;); pr" 18] Ct'imilwl 
Law, § 141; [16, 17, 19, 23] Criminal Law, § 14-1; [20-22, 2-t-2i] 
Criminal Law. § 140; [28J Homicide, § 242; [29] Rabens Corpu,:, 
§ 64. 
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in such a situation, the petition will be trell.ted as one for a 
writ of hahea~ eorpuf;. 
[4] ld.-Remedy as Colla.teral Attack.-An attack by haheas ('or-
pus 011 lIlultiple sentences is a collateral attack on the jnrigllH'nt. 
1.5] Courts-Jurisdiction.-"Jurisdiction" is not limited to its con-
ventional meaning of jurisdiction of the cause or the part iI's 
when the right to review a decision by It prerogative writ i~ 
the qu('stion for decision. 
[6] ld.-Jurisdiction.-A eomt may have jurisdidion of the cau~e 
of action and the parties, but may lack authority or power to 
act in the case except in a particular way. 'Under such circulll-
stances, the court has no jurisdiction to act in any other way. 
[7] Habeas Corpus-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-
A writ of habeas corpus may issue when the trial court has 
sentenced defendant to a term in excess of the maximum pro-
vided by law. 
[8] ld. - Writ as Substitute for Appeal. - Habeas corpus cannot 
serve as a substitute for appeal to review a determination of 
fact made on conflicting evidence. 
[9] ld.-Grounds for Relief.-A writ of habeas corpus will not lie 
to review a decision of a trial court that had discretion to 
follow different courf;es of action. 
[10] ld.-Grounds for Relief-Judgment or Sentence.-A writ of 
habeas corpus will is,;ne to review an invalid sentence when. 
without redetermination of nny facts, the judgment mny he 
corrected to accord with the only pos~ihle determination in 
the circumstances. 
[11] Statutes-Construction-Law or Fact.-The applicability of tl. 
statute to concetled facts is a question of' law. 
[12] Ha.beas Corpus - Grounds for Relief - Former Jeopardy.-
Where the facts are undisputed and the only qnestion as to the 
issue of multiple punbhlllent is the llpplicability of Pen. Code. 
§ 654, relating to acts made punishable by different proviiiions 
of the code, habeas corpus is a proper remedy to review that 
issue. 
(13) ld. - Grounds for Relief - Judgment or Sentence. - Habeas 
corpus is a proper remedy to review the i5sue whether tIll' 
Adult Authority has misinterpreted Pen. Code, § (JG4, suh,]' 1. 
and is therefore confining petitioner in cxce~s of the time n 1-
lowed by law. (Pen. Code, § 1487, subd. :2.) 
[5] See CaJ.Jur.2d, Courts, ~ 47; Am.Jur., Court~, § 159 d ~('Il. 
[10] Illegal or errone<)lJS ~('ntene(' as ground for hahea.; corpus, 
note, 76 A.L.R. 468. Sec abo Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpll~, §:19; 
Am.Jur., Habeas CorjJu~, § ;i:') ,-t seq. 
) 
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[14] Id. - Grounds for Relief - Judgment or Sentence. --- Even if 
petitioner is not entiUC'd to hi. illllllt,tlialt' 1'('\('a!'C' from impris-
onment, an alleged misinterpretation by th(' .\dult Authol'ity 
of the maximum Sl'nit'llcc under whil'h he is ~('r\'ing is re-
viewable by habeas corpn~, "incl' it wonlll nffN·t th(' Adult 
Authority's fixing of the prisoner'" inilt,tinite sentl'llee and 
his eligibility for parole. 
[15] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Different Offenses in Same 
Transa.ction.-PullishlJlent for t\\"o nll"ens('s arising from Ule 
same act is prohibited by thl' cons-titutional and cOIIIlJlon-law ; 
rule against multiple puni,dllilent for necessarily included I 
offenses and by Pen. Code, § 654, proyiding that an act or 
omission made punishubJe in differcnt ways by different pro-
visions of thl' code mny he l'llni:-:hahle undl'r ('ither but not 
more than one such provision. 
[16J Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-WhcI·e an of-
fense cannot he ('ollllllitl,;,1 witlwnt IIt·(·t''':;(\ril~· committing an-
other offense, the latter is a neeegsnrily included offense. 
(17] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-.\rson can bc 
committed w'ithout nttl'll1pting a muroer, and nn nttempted 
murder of a husband hy !'('tting a l!'nsoline fire in the spouse's 
bedroom could haye been cOllllnitted without nttempting to 
murder his wife. 
[18] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Di:lIerent Offenses in Same Trans-
action.-The proscription of Pen. Code, § 654, against multiple 
punishment of a single aet is not limited to necessarily in-
cluded offenses. 
[19] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-If only a single 
act is charged as the basis of llIultiple cOllvictions, only one 
conviction can be aml'med, notwith~tnlldin~ that the offenses 
are not necessarily included offenses. It is the singleness of the 
act, not of the oll'eu~(', that is determinative. 
[20] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Insofur as only 
a single nct is chnrged as the basis for a conviction, defendant 
can be punishl'd only once. 
[21] Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Pen. Code, 
§ 654, relating to ads mude puni:;hable by different provision'! 
of the code, may be applied not only wherc there is only (llle 
"act" in the ordinnry sense, hut nlso where It course of conduct 
violates 1I10l'e than one statute !llld the problem is whether it 
comprises a divisible tmnsaction which enn be punished ulllier 
more than one statute. 
(t2) Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Whether a 
course of crimi nul cOllllnct i:i divisible and therefore gives ri~c 
to more than one nct within the meaning of Pen. Code, § 654, 
depends on the intent and oJ.jective of the netor. If all offenses 
) 
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were incident to one objective, defendant lIlay be punished for 
nny one of >,ueh offense~, but not for more than one. 
[23] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Where charges 
of arson and attempted murdel' were based on defendant's act 
of throwing ga~oline into the bedroom of It married couple 
:111d igniting it, the arson was the meallS of perpetrating the 
crillle of attempted murder, and a cOllviction of both arson 
and attempted murder violated Pen. Code, § 654, since the arson 
was merely incidental to the primary ohjective of killing the 
husband and wife, and defendant could only be punished for 
the more serious offell~e, namely, attempted lllurder. 
[24] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The purpose of 
the protection against multiple punishment for a single act is 
to insure that defendant's punishment will be commensurate 
with his criminal liability. A defendant who commits an act 
of violence with intent to IJ:lrm more than one person or by a 
means likely to eause harm to several persons is more culpable 
than It defendant who harms only one per~on. 
[25} Id. - Former Jeopardy - Identity of Offenses. - Pen. Code, 
§ 654, relating to acts made punishable by different provisions 
of the code, is not applicable where one act has two results 
each of which is an aet of violence against the person of a 
separate indi,·idual. 
[26] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses . ......:.Where ehRrges 
of arson and attemptE'd Illurder were hased on defendRnt's act 
of throwing gasoline into the bedroom of a hUliband and wife 
and igniting it, consecutive sentences for attempted murder 
"'ere properly imposed. 
[27] Id.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-The preclusion, 
in Pen. Code, § 654, of multiple prosecution for a single act is 
separate and distinct from the preclusion of multiple punish-
ment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is a procedural 
safeguard against harassment and is not necessarily related 
to the punishment to be imposed; double prosecution may be 
precluded even when double punishment is permissible. 
[28] Homicide-Punishment-Attempted Murder.-Both the 1949 
and the present wording of Pen. Code, § 664, subd. 1, provide 
a maximum sentence of 20 years for nttempted murder. 
[29] Habeas Corpus-Judgment.-Where defendant was convicted 
of both ar~on and nttplllptCtl murd('r as the result of n single 
act of throwing gasolin!' into the bedroolll of a married couple 
and igniting it, the arwn eouvi(·tioIl, being in exce~5 of the 
jurisdiction of the court, was set aside on habeas eorpus and 
the Adult Authority dil'ede<1 to I'xelude from its consideration 
the purported sentence for al";;on. Defendant was not entitlcd 
to. re\ea~e, however, so long ns he was held under valid judg-
ments of cOllviction on the attempted munler charges, and the 
writ of habeas corpus was delliI'd. 
Dec. 1960] NEAl, v. STATE Ole CAI,IFORNIA 
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PROCEEDING in mandamus to compl'l the California 
Adult Authority to fL'i: the time when petitioner may be re-
leased 1'1'0111 pri~on. \Vrit (trcatl'u as writ of habeas corpus) 
denied. 
William H. Abbott, under appointmcnt by the Supreme 
Court, fot· Petitioner. Additional briefs were filcd by thp. 
Petitioner pro sc. 
Stalll("y Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and Ray-
mond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attorneys General, for Re,;pond-
ents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On Junc 4, 1949, petitioner threw gasoline 
into the bcdroom of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore R. Raymond and 
ignited it. The Raymonds were seyercly burned. Petitioner 
was tried and convicted on 1\vo counts of attempted murdcr 
and one count of arson, and the trial court ordered that the 
sentences for the two counts of attempted murder run con-
secutively. On appeal the court held that the convictions 
were supported by suffieient evidence and that no reversible 
error was committed during the trial on the issue of guilt. 
Owing to the admission of incompetent evidence on the ques-
tion of sentencing, however, the cause was remanded for a 
redetermination of the question whether the sentence for the 
second attempted murder should run consecutively or con-
currently. (People v. Neal, 97 Cal.App.2d 668 (218 P.2d 
556].) On August 9, 1950, the trial court again ordered that 
the two attempted murder sentences run consecutively. No 
further appeal was taken. 
Petitioner now seeks a writ of mandamus to order the 
Adult Authority to fix the time when he may be released 
from prison. He contends that subdivision 1 of Peual Cdile, 
section 664, provides a maximum sentence of 10 years for 
attempted murder and that his convictions on a second count 
of attemptcd murder and on a count of arson were invalid on 
the ground that thcy puni,;hed him three timrs for a single 
act in violation of Pcnal Code, section 654. 
Before we rcach the merits of petitioner's contcntions we 
must first determille whether they can be rai~ed, now that the 
judgment of eonvi"tion has hecome final. 
[1 J MalHlamus will not ortlinarily lie to corred an error 
in a final and appralable jn(lgmrnt. (0 'N cill v. Reynolds, 
116 Cal. 264, 266 [48 P. 57] ; Andrews v. Poll:ce Court, 21 
) 
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Ca1.2d 479,480 [133 P.2J. 3D8, 145 A.L.R. 1042].) (2] .\1-
though a writ of mandamus lIlay issue to vacate a jn(l;;plH'llt 
entered by a court that lackc(1 jurisdiction, a motion to Yltcate 
smh judgment must fir:;t oe made in thc court that rnten'(l 
the judgment, allli a tlrllial of such motion mu:;t be appeale(l 
in the regular manner. (Alldrews v. Superior Court, 29 
Ca1.2d 208,214 [174 P.2,l 313J ; see Phclan v. Supcrior Court, 
35 Ca1.2d 363,372 [217 P.2d 951J.) 
[3] The proper remedy, if any, is llabeas corpus. If the 
facts justify this remedy it is immaterial that·petitioner had 
prayed for an inappropriate one. (OWCllS v. Superior Court, 
52 Ca1.2d 822, 827 (345 P.2d 921J ; see 3 Witkin, California 
Procedure, pp. 2568-2569.) Accordingly, we treat this petition 
as one for a writ of habeas corpus. 
[ 4] The petitioner's attack on the multiple sentences is a 
collateral attack on the judgment. Subdivision 1 of Pcnal 
Code, section 1487, limits the review of erroneous judgments 
by habeas corpus to cases in which the conviction and sentence 
imposed were in excess of the jurisdiction of the court. The 
crucial question, therefore, is "'11cther the court acts in excess 
of its jurisdiction by imposing multiple sentences contrary to 
Penal Code, section 654. 
[5] The word jurisdiction is not limited to its conven-
tional meaning of jurisdiction of the cause or the parties when 
the right to review a decision by a prerogative writ is the 
question for decision. (Fortellbury v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 
2d 405, 407 [106 P.2d 4111; see In re BelT. 19 Cal.2d 488, 494 
[122 P.2d 22}.) [6] "A court may have jurisdiction of 
the cause of action and of the parties, but it may lack the 
authority or power to act in the case except in a particular way. 
Under such circumstanres, it is now generally held that the 
court had 110 jurisdiction." (Fortcllbury v. H11perior C01lrt, 
wpra, at pp. 407-408.) [7] Thus, the writ of habeas corpus 
has issued when the defendant was erroneously sentenced to 
an indeterminate rather than a fixed term (In 1'e Lee, 177 Cal. 
690,694 [171 P. 958]), and we have statrd that the writ li("'s 
\\'hen the trial court has sentelwed a nrfendant to a term ill 
rX"rss of the maximum provided hy law. (See In rc McInturff, 
~7 Cal.2d 876, 880 [236 P.2d 574] ; 111 1'C Morck, 180 Cal. 384 
(181 P. 657].) 
[8] Habeas corpus, however, r8nnot Sf"l"ve as It snbstitntp 
for appeal to review a netermination of fac't made on con-
flicting evidence. (In re Dixon, 41 C'a12tl 7;)6, 760 f264 P.2(1 
513J ; 111 re McInturff, 37 Ca1.2d 876, RSO [236 P.2d 574] ; In rl' 
/) 
) 
/ 
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Lindley,29 Ca1.2d 709,722 [177 P.2d 918] ; In re Connor, 16 
Ca1.2d 701, 705-706 p08 1'.2d 10].) [9] Nor will thc writ 
lie to review a decision of a trial court that bad discretion to 
follow different eourSl'S of action. [10] The writ will issue, 
however, to review an invalid sentence, when, without the re-
determination of any faets, the judgment may be corrected to 
-"accord with the only other possible determination ill the cir-
cumstances." (I'll l'C McIllturff. SlIpra, at p. 881.) 
The attorney general contends, however, that thc question 
whether a person has been made to suffer double punishment 
for a single act is a question of fact and therefore habeas 
corpus will not lie. He invokes 1/1 I'C Chapman, 43 CaI.2d 385, 
390 [273 P.2d 817] where the court stated: "Whether the 
evidence accepted by the trier of faet shows petitioner guilty 
of one crime or of two is in part a fadual question. 'It is, of 
course, an established rule that habeas corpus may not be 
used instead of an appeal to l'eyiew determinations of fact 
made upon conflicting evidence after a fair trial. [Citations.l 
Likewise, the writ is not available to correct errors or irregu-
larities relating to ascertainment of the faets wllcn such errorR 
could and should haye been raised by appeal. [Citations.]'" 
On the record herein we are not required to' review deter-
minations of fact made upon conflicting eyidenee or to correct 
errors or it'regulariti('s relating to ascertainment of the facts. 
The return to the order to show eause does not take issue with 
petitioner's statt'ment of facts. The recital of facts by both 
parties, apparently tllkt'n from the statement of facts in People 
v. Neal, 97 Cal.App.2d 668, 669-672 [218 P.2d 556], discloses 
only a single course of criminnl condllet illYolving the com· 
mission of three offenses. motivated by petitioner's determina-
tion to kill Mr. and Mrs. Raymond because he believed 1\[1'. 
Raymond had alil'nnted the affections of his wife. Our own 
t'xamillation of the trial transpript disdoses nothing to the con-
trary. Unlike In rc Chapman, slIll/'a, this is not a case, th('1'p-
fore, where the court in proc('l'ding to punish for aU threl~ 
convictions could be said to have rested its dp.tp.rmination UP0!l 
conflicting evidence. [11] The applirability of a stat1lte 
to eonceded facts is a qUl'stion of law. (Nrl.~oll v. :nlollfgomrry 
Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373, 376 [61 S.Ct. 593, 85 L.Ed. Sfl71 ; 
E.qtate of Madison, 26 Ca1.2d 4:)3, 456 [1;'9 P.2d 6301.) 
[12] Sin!'(' the facts in til" instant ea<;e arc un<1isplI\t'(1 
and the only qU('!o;tioll as to thC' i",.:ur of multi pIc puni"hmrllt 
is the applieahility of Pl'lJal CodC'. sl'etion 654, habeas corpm; 
is a proper remedy to revi('w that issue. 
) 
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[13] Habeas corpus is also a proper remedy to review 
the issue whether the Adult Authority has misinterpreted 
subdivision 1 of Penal Code, section 664, and is thercforc con-
fining pctitioner in excess of the time allowed by law. (Pen. 
Code, § 1487, subd.2.) [14] Even if the petitioner is 110t 
entitled to his immediate release, an allegcd misinterpretation 
by the Adult Authority of the maximulU sentence Wider which 
a prisoner is serving is redewable by habeas corpus, since it 
wouId affect the Adult Authority's fixing of the prisoner's 
indefinite sentence and his eligibility for parole. (See In re 
Chapmatl,43 Ca1.2d 385, 387 [273 r,2d 8171; People v. Keko.e, 
33 Cal.2d 711, 716 [204 P.2d 321J ; People v. Craig, 17 CaUd 
453,458-459 [110 P.2d 403].) 
'Ve therefore reach the merits. Petitioner's conviction of 
oue count of arson and two counts of attempted murder rests 
upon defendant's act of throwing gasoline into the bedroom of 
1\11'. and Mrs. Raymond and igniting it. [15] Punishment 
for two offenses arising from the same act is prohibited by the 
constitutional and common-law rule against mUltiple punish-
ment for necessarily included offenses (People v. Kelloe, 33 
Cal.2d 711, 713 [204 P.2d 321]) and by Penal Code, section 
654, which provides that "An act or omission ,vmch is made 
punishable in diffcrent ways by different provisions of this 
code may be puuishable under either of such provisions, but 
in no case can it be punished under more than one."l 
None of Neal's convictions is for a necessarily included of-
fense. [ 16] "[W] here an offense cannot be committed 
without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is 
a necessarily included offense." People v. Greer, 30 Cal.2d 
589, 596 [184 P.2d 512].) [17] Arson can be committed 
without attempting a murder, and the attempted murder of 
Mr. Raymond could have been committed without attempting 
to murder Mrs. Raymond. 
[18] The proscription of section 654 against multiple 
punishment of a single act, however, is not limited to neces-
sarily included offenses. (People v, Loga11, 41 Cal.2d 279, 290 
[260 P.2d 20] ; People v. Knowles. 35 CaJ.2d 175, 187 [217 
P.2d 1] ; People v. Kyncitc, 15 CaJ.2d 73], 761-762 r104 r.2d 
'Although section 654 docs not expressly preclude douhle punishment 
wIlen an act gives rise to more than on(' \'iolntion of the BRllle Ptmal Code 
sedion or to multiple violntioll~ of th/? criminnl provi~ion8 of other codes, 
it is settled tbat the hnllie prillt'ipic it I'llun!'iates precludes double punisb, 
ment in sucb cnses nl~o. (Pl'opi,' v. Broll'n,4!1 ('nJ.2d ;'77, :';91 [320 P.2d 
:;1; see People v. Robl'rt.~, 40 CnJ.2d 4S3, 4!11 [2:;4 P.2d ;jOl]; People v. 
Clefllett, 208 Cal. 142, 144 [280 P. 681]; I'roplo v. Nor Wooa., 37 Cal.2d 
584, 586 [233 P.2d 897].) 
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794] ; accord: People v. Repola, 280 App.Div. 735, 281 App. 
Diy. 679 [117 N.Y.S.:!d :!sa, 288], aflil'll1t'tl 303 XY. 740 
[113 N.E.2il 421] ; l'evple Y. S(wansc, 1 Misc.2tl 305 [114 
N.Y.S.2d 816, S3G-S3H 1 ; SN' l'eoplc v. SlIyder, 241 N.Y. 81, 83 
[148 N.B. 7!JG] lillt('I'lll'etill~ N.Y. P~>n. Code, § 1938, whieh 
is identical with CaL Pcn. Code, § 654].) In People Y. Knowles 
35 Cal.2d 173, 187 [217 P .2d 1], we stated: "If a COurse of 
criminal conduct causes the commission of more than onp. 
offense, each of which Call be committed without committing 
any other, the applicability of section 654 will depend upon 
whether a separate and distinct act can be established as the 
basis of each conviction, or whether a single act has been so 
comrilitted that more than olle statute has been violated. 
[19] If only a single act is charged as the basis of the 
multiple convictions, only one cOllviction can be affirmed, not-
withstanding that the offenses are not necessarily included 
offenses. It is the singleness of the act and not of the offense 
that is determinative." Thus the act of placing a bomb into 
an automobile to kill the oWllrr may form the basis for a con· 
viction of attempted murder, 01' a.'!Sault with intent to kill, or 
malicious use of explosiyes. [20] Insofar as only a single 
act is charged as the basis for the cOllviction, however, the 
defendant can be puuished only once. (People v. Kynette, 15 
Cal.2d 731, 762 [104 P.2d 7941.) Likewise, the act of using 
an instrument to cause an abortion which results in death 
can be punished for abortion or for murder in the second 
degree but not for bot11. (People v. Brow?!, 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590· 
594 [320 P.2d 5].) 
Few if any crimes, however, are the result of a single 
physical act. [21] c, Section 654 has been applied not only 
where there was but one 'act' in the ordinary sense ••. but 
also where a course of. conduct violated more than one statute 
and the problem was whether it comprised a divisible trans· 
action which could be punished under more than one statute 
within the meaning of s(>ction 654." (People v. Brown, supra, 
591.) 
[22] Whether a course of criminal conduct is diyisibln 
and therefore I?ives rise to more than one act within the m(>an· 
ing of srction 654 drpends on the intent and objective of the 
actor. If all of the ofTrll.;;rs were inrid<'nt to one objective, the 
defendant may be puni<::llPd for anyone of such offenses hut 
not for more than one. 
Thus in Proplc v. IO(Jan,41 Cal.2d 279, 290 [260 P.2d 201, 
defendant, w110 chose to commit robbery by first knocking out 
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his victim wit.h a baseball bat and then taking his valuables was 
f!onvictcd of both robbcr'y and assault. \V C rcYcl'sc<1 the assault 
cOllviction 011 the ground that the double puuishment violated 
section 654. In In rc Chapman, 43 Ca1.2d 385, 387 [273 P.2d 
817], however, we held that when the assault is not a means of 
perpetrating the robbery but is an act that follows after tIll' 
robbery is completed the defendant is guilty of two punishable 
acts. Likewise in People v. Greer, 30 Ca1.2d 589, 600 l184 
P.2d 512], statutory rape and lewd and lasciyious conduct 
were held to be one act since both offenses arose from a single 
act of sexual intercourse. In People v. Slobodian, 31 Ca1.2d 
555, 561-563 [191 P .2d 1], however, we sustained convictions 
for sex perversion and lewd and lascivious conduct, even 
though both aeis were closely connected in time and a part 
of the same criminal venture since the act giving risc to the 
lewd and lascivious conduct was separate and distinct and 
was not incidental to or the means by which the act of sex 
perversion was accomplished. 
[23] In the instant case the arson was the means of per-
petrating the crime of attempted murder just as the malicious 
use of explosives was the means for perpetrating .the attempted 
murder in People v. Kynette, and the assault with the baseball 
bat was the means of committing robbery ill People v. Logan. 
The conviction for both arson and attempted murder violated 
Penal Code, section 654, since the arson was merely incidental 
to the primary objective of killing Mr. and Mrs. Raymond. 
Petitioner, therefore, can only be punished for the more 
serious offense, which is attempted murder. 
The two attempted murder convictions, however, present 
a different problem. [24] The purpose of the protection 
against multiple punishment is to insure that the defendant's 
punishment will be commensurate with his criminal liability. 
A. defendant who commits an act of violence with the intent 
to harm more than one person or by a means likely to cause 
harm to several persons is more culpable than a defendant 
who harms only one pE'rson. For example, a defendant who 
chooses a means of murder that places a planeload of passen-
gers in danger, or results in injury to many persons, is prop-
erly subject to greater punishment than a defendant who 
chooses a means that harms only a single person. This rlis-
tinction between an act of violence against the person that 
violates more than one statute and such an art that harms 
more than one person is well settled. [25] Scction 654 is 
not" ... applicable where ... one act has two results each of 
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which is an act of violcll(,(' Hg-ainst the pl'rsOIl of a separate 
individual." (People v. Brllnlloll. 70 Cal.App. 223. 235-236 
[233 P. 88] ; sce also People \-. Jlajor. 65 Cal. 138. 146 [:3 
P. 597,52 Am.Rcp. 295] ; People v. Gaither. ]73 Cal.App.2d 
662,668 [343 P.2d 799] ; Peoplc v. Holmall. 72 Cal.App.2d 75, 
100 [164 P.2d 297].) Thus, in Peoplc Y. J(n()!cl('.~, supra, 35 
Ca1.2d 175, 187, the def(>ndants lddnaped t\\'o persons for the 
purpose of robbing thcm. The robbery cOllvictions were re-
versed by reason of Penal Code, section 654, but both kidnap-
ing convictions were affirmed. 
[26] The two consecutive attempted murder convictions 
were therefore prop(>rly impos(>d. Since pel itioner was tried 
for both crimes at the same time we do not decidewhethpr 
section 654 ref[uircs all of the prost'l'utions to be bronght at the 
same time. [27] St'<'tion 6:54 's predusion of multiplc 
prosecution is separate and distinct from its preclusion of mul-
tiple punishment. The rule against multiple prosecutions is 
a procedural safeguard against harassment and is not neces-
sarily related to the punishmt'ut to be imposed; double prosecu-
tion may be precluded even when double punishment is per-
missible. 
[28] Petitioner's contention that subdivision 1 of Penal 
Code, section 664, provides for a maximum sentence of 10 years 
for attempted murder is without merit. Both the 1949 and 
present wording of the section provide a maximum sentence 
of 20 years for the crime of attempted murder. 
[29] The arson conviction, being in PKcess of the juris-
diction of the court, is set aside, and the Adult Authority is 
directed to exclucle from its con1';idrration the purported sen-
tence for arson. Petitioner, howevpr, is not rntitled to release 
so long as he is held nnder valid jn(l~mrnts of conviction for 
his other crimes. The order to show cause is, therefore, dis-
charged and the writ of habeas corpus is denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In my opinion review of the 
question whether a prisoner is being punished under more than 
one penal statute for one "aet" within the meaning of Pcnal 
Code, section 654, presrllts n prohlp1I1 of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to show that the course of (·"iminal conduct whil'h 
resulted in multiple' s('nt(,l1<'es was a divisible transaction. 
(See the treatment of the f[llcslion in sueh cases as People v. 
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Greer (1947), 30 Ca1.2d 589, 604 [184 P.2d 512] ; People Y. 
Slobodion (1948),31 Ca1.2d 555,562-563 [191 P.2d 1] ; People 
v. Knowles (1950), 35 Cal.2d 175, 188 [13b] [217 P.2d 1] ; 
People v. Kehoe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 711, 714-715 [204 P.2d 
321] ; People v. Logan (1953), 41 Ca1.2d 279, 290 [11] [260 
P.2d 20]; People v. Brown (1958), 49 Ca1.2d 577, 590-591 
[13] [320 P.2d 5]; cf. People v. Hoyt (1942),20 Ca1.2d 306, 
316-317 [8] [125 P.2d 29].) 
Although the majority say (ante, p. 17) that they do 
not review a question of fa<-t but· determine .<Hily a question 
of law-the application of a statute to uncontradicted facts-
actually they review and strike down a factual determination 
which rested upon evidence that supports the contrary infer-
ences on which the trial court based its final judgments. The 
majority in effect recognize that their redetermination neces-
sarily involves a review of the sufficiency of the evidence by 
the manner in which they state the general test whereby they 
would solve the problem. They say (ante, p. 19) that 
"Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible and there-
fore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of 
section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. 
If all of the offenses were incident to one objective, the de-
fendant may be punished for anyone of such offenses but not 
for more than one." 'Vhether the criminal's intent is directed 
toward one principal" objective" and whether his oth('r crimes 
are merely" incident" to that objective, under the majority's 
view, would be questions for initial decision by the trial court, 
for review on appeal, and again (""h('ther or not the questions 
were raised at the trial Or on appeal) for review on hab('as 
corpus by every court (in felony cases the superior court, the 
District Court of Appeal and this court) which has jurisdic-
tion. But such review by habeas corpus obviously could not be 
carried out in an informed fashion except by appraising the 
evidence which was presented at the trial or perhaps (the 
majority suggest no limitation in this regard) by taking evi-
dence additional to that received at the trial. 
It requires no extensive evidential statement to demonstrate 
that the issue which the majority here resolve is in essence 
factual and that in effect the majority have retried the case 
insofar as the arson count is con('('rned. The defendant was 
charg('d with and convicted of two crimes against persons 
(attempted murders) and 01H' (·rime ag-aillst property (arson). 
As pertinent herE', murdl'r is /lpfilled b.v PPllal Co<1(', section 
187 ("Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with 
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malice aforethought") awl sedioll 189 (" All murder which 
is perpetrated by ... wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate al'son, rape, robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any 
act punishable unuer Section 288, is murder of the first de-
gree .... ") \Italic~ aUIled). Attempted murder is made PUll-
ishable by subdivision 1 of section 664 of the Penal Code, and 
by legal defiuition attempted murder is the doing of a direct, 
ineffectual act toward consummation of the intended murder. 
(See People v. Snyder (1940),15 Ca1.2d 706, 708 [1] [104 P. 
2d 639] ; People v. Camodcea (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 142, 145 [lJ 
[338 P.2d 903].) Arsoll, as pertinent here, is defined by sec-
tion 447a of the Penal Code ("Any person who wilfully and 
maliciously sets fire to or burns or causes to be burned ... any 
dwelling house ... shall be guilty of arSOll .. , ."). Here the de-
fendant intended to, and-did, accomplish the crime of arson, 
and he also intended and attempted, but failed, to accomplish, 
two killings in the perpetration of arson. Obviously the crime 
of attempted murder is of a class separate from the crime of 
arson and each class involves proof of one or more factual ele-
ments not common to the other. The three convictions were re-
viewed on appeal (People v. Neal (1950), 97 Cal.App.2d 668 
[218 P.2d 556) and the reviewing court considered and com-
mented not only on evidence tending to establish the crimes 
against the persons of the victims of attempted murder, par-
ticularly the evidence of "specific intent to murder Mr. and 
Mrs. Raymond" (p. 672 [2,3] of 97 Cal.App.2d) but also on 
the evidence ,vhich tended to show that defendant wilfully and 
maliciously burned the house in which they dwelt (p. 670 [1] 
of 97 Cal.App.2d) and "had an inclination to pyromania" 
(p. 673 [5] of 97 Cal.App.2d). In these circumstances I 
cannot agree with the majority that the criminal who deliber-
ately chose to commit both arson and murder by the same 
incendiary course of conduct necessarily and as a matter of 
law committed but one" act ... which is made punishable in 
different ways by different provisions of this code" (Pen. 
Code, § 654). 
The subject use of habeas corpus is squarely contrary to 
the following rules: "[IIJ abeas corpus may not be used in-
stead of an appeal to review determinations of fact made upon 
conflicting evidence after a fair tria1. [Citations.] Likewise, 
the writ is not available to correct errors or irregularities 
relating to ascertainment of the facts when such errors could 
. and should have been raised by appeal. [Citations.]" (In r. 
) 
" ) 
J 
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Dixon (1953). 41 Ca1.2d 7£;6,760 [6,7] [264 P.2U 513].) In 
the case of III rc Chapman (1954), 43 Ca1.2d 385, 3VO [9, 10] 
[273 P.2d 817], although we passed 011 and rdected the 1l1et"its 
of a prisoner's contention, raised on llabeas corpus, that his 
course of criminal conduct could be punished only Ollce, we 
also pointed out that "Whether the evidcnce acccpted by thl' 
trier of fact shows petitioner guilty of olle crime 01' of two [or 
of a course of criminal conduct which, although it constitutes 
two separately defined crimes, can be punished but onee by 
reason of section 654] is in part a factual question," and we 
quoted and relied on the foregoing rules statf.!d in the Dixon 
case as an alternate ground for denying the ,vrit. 
While I have approved of and participated in decisions of 
this court which have somewhat broadened the uses of habeas 
corpus, employment of the writ to review or initially decide 
'luestions of the intent and objective of the criminal actOl" 
seems to me to be a radical departure which goes far beyond 
the scope of the writ as previously extended. (See In re Mc-
Inturff (1951),37 Cal.2d 876,880 [3] [236 P.2d 574].) Many 
California prison('rs are serving multiple final sentences for 
offenses variously connected in their commission; snch prison-
ers will, of course, be encouraged by today's decision to flood 
this court, or lower courts, with applications for similar evi-
dential reviews. I think it unsound and highly undesirable 
to now permit-indeed, require--the courts to go behind these 
final judgments and open or reopen the often difficult and in 
large part factual questions attendant upon the application 
of section 654. 
The problems inherent in the majority's action will become 
particularly complex if the courts are to continue to assume 
to review on habeas corpus the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support separate sentences for the crimes which arc enumer-
ated in Penal Code, section 189, as a part of the definition 
of murder of the first degree l and for murders or attempted 
murders factually connected with such felonies. It has been 
routine procedure in such cases to sentence defendants both 
for murder and for the othcr felony named in section 189. 
{E.g., People v. Chavez (1958),50 Ca1.2d 778, 782-783 [arson] 
[329 P.2d 907] ; People v. Riley (1950), 35 Ca1.2d 279, 280 
[robbery] [217 P.2d 625] ; People v. Simeone (1945),26 Ca1.2rl 
II, All murder which ill ••• eommitted in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate arson. rape. robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act puniab· 
able under Seetion 288, is murder of the first degree .••• " (Pen. Code. 
t 189.) 
) 
) 
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795, 797 [robbery] [161 P.2d 369] ; People v. Kelso (1945), 
25 Ca1.2d 848, 849 [burglary] [155 P.2d 819] ; People v. Hill 
(1943),22 Ca1.2d 863, 864 [rohbery] [141 P.2d 418] ; People 
v. Ki'TIg (1939), 13 Ca1.2d 521, 522-523 [robbery] [90 P.2d 
291].) And in what appears to be the only case ill which the 
question was particularly discussed, it was held that such sen-
tences (for robbery and murder in the perpetration of the 
robbery) did not contravene section 654. (People v. Hoyt 
(1942), supra, 20 Ca1.2d 306, 316-317 [8].) Are the courts 
now to reexamine the eases of prisoners serving final sentences 
of imprisonment for both murder and a related robbery and 
to determine whether a defendant set out to rob and inei~ 
dentally killed or set out to kill and incidentally robbed (in 
either of which events, under the majority's holding, he could 
be sentenced at most for murder), or whether pel'ehance he set 
out to commit both robbery and murder and exeeuted both of 
his intents as part of the same transaction by divisible acts T 
As another example of diffieulties with which the courts will 
nmv be confronted (if today's majority deeision is consistently 
applied), reference may bc made to prisoners who are confined 
under multiple sentences for forgeries and use of false writiugs 
in closely related transactions. Where such mnltiple convie-
tions (in one class of crime or another) have been sustained 
(see In re Horowitz (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 534,541-545 [4] [203 
P.2d 5131 ; People v. Cline (1947), 79 Cal.App.2d 11, 19 [4] 
[179 P.2d 89]) or have never been questioned, as is doubtless 
true in hundreds of easC's, can thC'se prisoners now obtain rC'-
view by habeas eorpus to decide the question whether their 
offenses ean be puuished but oncc bE'cause thcy had but one 
objectiveT 
Furthermore, it does not appear that the majority furnish 
a satisfactory tE'st to be applied by sentencing eourts.2 Under 
the majority view, for example, a defendant who chooses to 
fire one shot as a m(>a11S of murdering A, sllcc(>edl". only in 
terrifying A, but in('i(l('ntally kills bystandf'r B, would appar-
ently be punishahle both for thf' murdf'r of B anel the assault 
on A (a violntion of two l".tntutes b~' one act). (See antf'. pp. 
20-21: PM117c Y. Brannon (1924), 70 Ca1.App. 225. 23:; f51 
[233 P. 88].) Bnt a dl'f(,ll<1nnt W110 ehoo!;!'!; arson of B's build-
-:In tbis regnrd my conecm is with {utur!' application of the majority 
opinion by trilll courts; at this writing it would seem imprnrtieal if not 
impossible to formulnte n ~ingle, general test which would ('ncompaSB o.J1 
the previous, ineonsistent appellate derisions concerning mUltiple punish· 
ment under section 654. 
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iug, occupieu by A, as a means of both murdering A and in-
juring B by destroying his property, amI who succceds in de-
stroying the building but not in killing A., would be punishable 
at most for attempted murder of A. because he committed only 
the one act of setting fire to a bUilding. This does 110t appear 
to be "punishment •.. commensurate with his criminal lia-
bility" (ante, p. 20), one of the theoretical bases apparently 
relied on by the majority both to permit punishment for two 
offenses in the first instance and for only one offense in the 
second instance. 
My principal concern, however, as already indirated is the 
misuse of habeas corpus to strike down the final judgment of 
conviction of arson on the ground (allte, p. 21) tlIat it is "in 
excess of the jurisdiction of the [trial] court" bccause of its 
factual connection with the attempted murders. For the rea-
sons above stated I cannot join in the opinion or the judgment 
and would, instead, simply discharge the order to show cause 
and deny any relief to the petitioner, whether his application 
be treated as one seeking habeas corpus, mandate, or some other 
undesignated remedy. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
The applications of petitioner and of respondent for a re-
hearing were denied January 10, 1961. Schauer, J., and Mc-
Comb, J., were of the opinion that the applications should be 
granted. 
